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TORTS-CAUSES OF ACTION EXIST FOR NEGLIGENCE, INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, AND
FRAUD FOR TRANSMISSION OF A SEXUALLY COMMUNICABLE DISEASE BETWEEN UNMARRIED PARTNERS. B.N. v.
K.K., 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988).
Sexually transmitted diseases (STDs) have existed for thousands of
years. Biblical accounts describe venereal diseases akin to the herpes
simplex virus, and a herpes epidemic during the Roman Empire is well
documented. I Within the last thirty years, however, changing attitudes
and sexual behavior have resulted in a considerable increase in the
number of reported cases of STDs. 2
Two of the most widespread STDs in the nation today are the
herpes simplex virus (HSV)3 and acquired immune deficiency syndrome
1. Willcox, Venereal Disease in the Bible, 25 BRIT. J. VENEREAL DISEASE 28 (March
1949); see also Leo, The New Scarlet Letter, TIME, Aug. 2, 1982 at 62.
2. Especially between 1966 and 1984, the number of reported cases of genital herpes
rose dramatically. Data collected by random sample of private physicians in the
United States indicates that, during that period, consultations for genital herpes increased almost fifteen-fold from 29,560 to 450,570. Genital Herpes Infection United States, 1966-1984,35 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 402 (June
20, 1986) [hereinafter MMWR Genital Herpes Infection in the u.s.]. From 1980 to
1984 alone, physician-patient consultations rose two-fold from less than 225,000 in
1980 to 450,570 in 1984, and it is estimated that there are approximately 500,000
new cases of genital herpes each year. Id. See also Wheeler, The Herpes Simplex
Problem, 18 J. AM. ACAD. DERMATOL. 163-64 (1988).
Likewise, the incidence of individuals infected with the acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) virus has reached epidemic proportions in the United
States. According to figures released by the Centers for Disease Control, the
number of persons testing positive for the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) in
the United States as of November 30,1989 totaled 115,158. Ofthis number, 68,441
have died. Center for Disease Control, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Monthly Report
(Dec. 1989). Notwithstanding the number of reported cases of HIV infection, it is
estimated that between 945,000 and 1,400,000 people are infected with HIV nationwide. Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in the United States: A Review of
Current Knowledge, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 342, 356 (Dec.
18, 1987) [hereinafter MMWR HIV Infection in the U.S.]. In addition, it is estimated that for every person who has developed symptoms of AIDS, there are 50 to
100 people who are asymptomatic but HIV positive. See Legal, Medical and Governmental Perspectives on AIDS as a Disability, 1987 A.B.A. Commission on the
Mentally Disabled Rep.
In Maryland, 2011 individuals have been reported as infected with AIDS as of
September 30, 1989. Of that number, 1202 individuals have died. The epidemic
proportion of this disease can best be recognized by considering that as of December
31, 1988, 1491 persons tested positive for the HIV. Compare Maryland AIDS Update (Sept. 30, 1989) with Maryland AIDS Update (Dec. 31, 1988).
3. Herpes simplex is a highly contagious and incurable disease that most frequently
affects the mucous membrane areas of the human body. There are two subtypes of
the herpes simplex. virus: HSV-l and HSV-2. Although both types can cause facial
and genital infection, "[g]enital HSV-2 infection is twice as likely to be reactivated
and recurs 8 to 10 times more frequently than genital HSV-l infection." Corey &
Spear, Infection with Herpes Simplex Viruses, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 749 (Mar. 20,
1986). Other strains of the herpes virus not classified as "simplex" include herpes
encephalitis (inflammation of the brain), herpes keratitis (inflammation of the cornea), and herpes zoster (shingles). 2 J. SCHMIDT, ATTORNEYS' DICTIONARY OF
MEDICINE (MB), at H-81 to H-82 (1988 & Supp. 1989).
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(AIDS).4 Both the public and private sectors have launched intensive
efforts at the state and national levels to educate the public to the dangers
of these diseases and the methods of curbing their spread. 5 The question
remains, however, what effect increased awareness, without additional
measures, will have on the spread of these devastating diseases. 6
What is clear from the number of reported cases of STDs and the
efforts to educate the public is that individuals must reevaluate their sexual practices. Today, courts more frequently are defining the limits of
acceptable sexual behavior. Judicial imposition of fault and the corresponding formulation of a legal remedy can further social policies, thus
providing individuals with a means of redress, and, at the same time,
deterring negligent or reckless conduct. The Court of Appeals of Maryland's holding in B.N. v. K.K.7 provides a remedy to persons who contract sexually transmitted diseases due to the irresponsible sexual
behavior of others.
Imposition of tort liability for transmission of contagious diseases,
while relatively new to Maryland, has existed for over a century in other
jurisdictions. 8 Infected plaintiffs have recovered under various theories
including negligence, 9 intentional infliction of emotional distress, 10
4. Although the exact etiology of AIDS is unknown, scientists recognize that AIDS is
caused by a retrovirus known as HIV, which attacks a person's immune system and
weakens or destroys his ability to ward off disease. It is for this reason that those
afflicted with AIDS contract rare diseases such as Pneumocystis carinii pneumonia,
which is the most common cause of death in AIDS patients. See generally Friedland, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: General Overview, 32 INT'L J.
NEUROSCIENCE 677 (1987)[hereinafter Friedland, AIDS: General Overview]. The
three most common means of contracting the HIV are homosexual activity, the
sharing of contaminated hypodermic needles by intravenous drug users, and blood
transfusion. See generally MMWR HIV Infection in the U.S., supra note 2, at 34244; see also infra note 89.
5. In 1988 the u.S. Department of Health & Human Services (HHS) sent a brochure
to every household in the United States in an effort to educate the public about the
nature and effect of AIDS and the means for its prevention and control. See Understanding AIDS, HHS Pub. No. 88-8404 (1988) [hereinafter Understanding AIDS].
6. Results of a 1982 random telephone survey of 2363 people conducted for ABC
News and The Washington Post indicate that not only are people more aware of the
recent increase in STDs, but also that they are changing their sexual behavior as a
result. Aral, Cates & Jenkins, Genital Herpes: Does Knowledge Lead to Action?, 75
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 69 (1985).
7. 312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988).
8. Infection with non-sexually transmitted disease often was the basis of liability. See,
e.g., Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953) (tuberculosis); Skillings
v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919) (scarlet fever); Hendricks v. Butcher,
144 Mo. App. 671, 129 S.W. 431 (1910) (smallpox); Kliegel v. Aitken, 94 Wis. 432,
69 N.W. 67 (1896) (typhoid fever).
9. Several courts have imposed liability on a negligence theory. See, e.g., Duke v.
Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo.) ("One who negligently exposes another to an
infectious or contagious disease, which such other person thereby contracts, can be
held liable in damages for his actions.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
863 (1979). Negligence served as an alternate basis of liability in Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 519, 105 S.E. 206, 208 (1920) ("[A]side from the question of
assault, it is a well-settled proposition of law that a person is liable if he negligently
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fraud,1l and assault or battery.12
A cause of action in negligence is based upon the existence of a duty,
breach of that duty, causation-both factual and legal-and damage. 13
In the context of a sexually transmitted disease case, the existence of a
duty is defined by the ability of the person knowingly infected with the
disease to foresee that his partner may become infected as a result of his
act or omission. 14 The relationship between partners to an intimate sexual encounter, and the interest of the state in protecting its citizens from
the spread of STDs, also gives rise to a duty on the part of one knowingly
infected with an STD to abstain from sexual relations, or to advise an
intimate partner of the risk of contracting the disease. IS
exposes another to a contagious or infectious disease.") (citing Skillings v. Allen,
143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919».
10. During the last two decades, an increasing number of jurisdictions have adopted the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. ATLA L. REP. 203-07 (June
1988). The Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized this cause of action in Harris
v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 380 A.2d 611 (1977). See also infra notes 26-29 and accompanying text. More recently, this tort has served as a basis for liability in suits
involving sexually transmitted disease. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App.
3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
11. De Vall v. Strunk, 96 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936) (defendant infected plaintiff
with crab lice after obtaining plaintiff's consent to have sexual intercourse upon a
fraudulent promise of marriage).
12. Cromwell, 180 N.C. at 520, 105 S.E. at 209. Assault or battery has also served as a
basis for criminal liability. See, e.g., State v. Lankford, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 102
A. 63 (1917) (husband guilty of assault and battery for transmitting syphilis to his
wife).
13. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 164-65 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
14. See Kathleen K, 150 Cal. App. 3d at 995-96, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 275; see also Comment, AIDS - Liability for Negligent Sexual Transmission, 18 CUMBo L. REV. 691,
707 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, AIDS Transmission]; Comment, You Wouldn't
Give Me Anything, Would You? Tort Liability for Genital Herpes, 20 CAL. W.L.
REV. 60, 65 (1983) [hereinafter Comment, Tort Liabilityfor Herpes]. Because of the
highly contagious nature of STDs such as herpes and AIDS, the foreseeability of
injury may extend to innocent third parties such as spouses and unborn fetuses. See
Mussirand v. David, 45 Ohio St. 3d 314, 544 N.E.2d 265,272 (1989) ("If one negligently exposes a married person to a sexually transmitable disease without informing that person of his exposure, it is reasonable to anticipate that the disease may be
transmitted to the married person's spouse."). For a general discussion o( third
party actions, see Comment, The Consequences of an Uninformed Menage A Trois
Extraordinaire: Liability to Third Parties for the Nondisclosure of Genital Herpes
Between Sexual Partners, 29 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 787, 808-10 [hereinafter Comment,
Herpes: Liability to Third Parties].
15. R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 106-08 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988). A duty to disclose one's infected condition may exist even when the disease is in a latent or
asymptomatic state. Although some studies suggest that genital herpes can be
transmitted only during active outbreaks of the disease (i.e., open, oozing sores),
other studies suggest that genital herpes can be transmitted at times when the disease is neither visible nor producing symptoms. Compare W. WICKETT, HERPES:
CAUSE AND CONTROL 17 (1982) with Wheeler, The Herpes Simplex Problem, J.
AM. ACAD. DERMATOL. 163, 165 (Jan. 1988); see also Mertz & Corey, Genital
Herpes Simplex Virus Infections in Adults, in UROLOGIC CLINICS OF NORTH
AMERICA: SYMPOSIUM ON SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASE III (R. Berger,
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To constitute a breach of duty in a negligence action for transmission of an STD, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant knew or
should have known he was infected with an STD and that he either failed
to abstain from conduct likely to transmit the disease, or, at the very
least, failed to inform the plaintiff of the risk of contracting the disease. 16
The third, and arguably most difficult, element a plaintiff to a negligence action must prove is that the defendant's act or failure to act was
the proximate cause of the injury sustained. 17 Two separate, but related
causes must be proved: factual cause and legal cause. IS
In the context of STDs, the plaintiff's infection will likely be linked
to some type of sexual contact. 19 Therefore, a plaintiff in a monogamous
relationship can easily prove that "but for" the defendant's negligence in
failing to recognize and disclose the nature of his infection, the plaintiff
would never have contracted the disease. 2o
Legal causation is often defined by the defendant's ability to foresee
adverse effects of his act or omission. 21 The levels of foreseeability will
differ depending on the status of the defendant. If, for example, the defendant experiences recurrent outbreaks of herpes, the extent of foreseeability is broad. If, however, the defendant is unaware of his condition,
or, unaware that his paramour is involved in other promiscuous relation-

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

21.

M.D., ed. 1984). Consequently, notwithstanding whether a person believes or has
been advised that he is incapable of transmitting the disease, he may have a duty to
disclose his condition at all times. Comment, Liability in Tort for the Sexual Transmission of Disease: Genital Herpes and the Law, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 101, 121
(1984) [hereinafter Comment, Genital Herpes and the Law]; see also infra note 31.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 164.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 263-80; see also Cutlip v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 22 Md. App. 673, 689-90, 325
A.2d 432, 441-42 (1974).
The transmission of AIDS, unlike that of other STDs, often occurs without any
physical contact whatsoever. Nonetheless, the plaintiff may sufficiently satisfy the
factual cause element. See infra note 20 and accompanying text.
Problems may arise, however, when the plaintiff has had sexual relations with two
or more partners. In such a case, the plaintiff will bear the additional burden of
proving that the sexual conduct of the defendant was the cause of transmission of
the disease. Consequently, a plaintiff must inquire into the medical conditions of all
partners during the approximate time of the initial outbreak.
Given the epidemic proportion of individuals infected with STDs, see supra
note 2, it is possible that a plaintiff's inquiry will result in a finding that more than
one partner was infected with the same disease. In such an event, traditional tort
law concepts will not deem the plaintiff incapable of recovery merely because the
true tortfeasor cannot be identified with particularity. Maharam v. Maharam, 123
A.D.2d 165, 171, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104, 108 (1986), Instead, the burden will shift to
the defendants to prove that their actions were not the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff's
injury. See Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal.2d 80, 199 P.2d I (1948).
Medical advances in DNA fingerprinting may provide a plaintiff with the ability to identify with particularity the partner who transmitted the infection at issue,
whether it be herpes or AIDS. See Comment, Herpes: Liability to Third Parties,
supra note 14, at 809-10.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 244 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter
PROSSER ON TORTS)'
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ships and the infection originating from the defendant is transmitted to
others, the foreseeability is very low and may negate liability. 22
The final element of a prima facie negligence action is proof that the
plaintiff sustained actual injury or damage. 23 A showing that the plaintiff
is infected with an STD is sufficient to satisfy the injury element of the
tort. 24
Upon proof of both the defendant's intentional or reckless nondisclosure of the presence of an STD and the plaintiff's subsequent infection, the plaintiff may recover under one or more causes of action for
intentional tort. All intentional torts require that the plaintiff prove the
defendant had actual knowledge that his act or omission would result in
harm. 25
Within the last fifteen years, Maryland has expressly recognized the
tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. 26 The plaintiff must
prove four elements: (1) the defendant's conduct must be intentional or
reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous;27 (3) there
must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be severe. 28 Recovery
for intentional infliction of emotional distress normally is limited to injuries which involve no physical contact between the parties. Courts recognize, however, the validity of such an action in the context of STDs.29
22. The participation of the defendant's paramour in promiscuous relations with third
parties is a supervening act that may relieve the defendant of liability. See Restate·
ment (Second) of Torts § 441 (1965). For a comprehensive discussion of third party
issues arising from the transmission of venereal diseases, see Comment, Herpes: Liability to Third Parties, supra note 14, at 801.
23. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 165.
24. Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 540, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (1985).
25. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 36. For this reason, a plaintiff may desire to
bring an alternative claim for negligence to avoid the possibility of not meeting the
burden of proving the defendant's intent to harm or his actual or imputed knowledge of the contagious nature of the infection. Under a negligence theory, the plaintiff need only prove that a reasonable person, similarly situated, would have
recognized both the existence and possibility of transmitting the disease. See Brown
v. Ellis, 236 Md. 487, 497, 204 A.2d 526, 530-31 (1964); see also infra note 31.
26. Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 566, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977).
27. The court will make an initial determination whether the alleged acts constitute
extreme and outrageous conduct. Upon an affirmative finding, the court will submit
the case to the jury to determine whether to impose liability. [d. at 569, 380 A. 2d
at 615.
28. [d. at 566,380 A.2d at 614 (citing Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 210 S.E.2d
145 (1974)).
29. Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 333 S.E.2d 852 (1985); Kathleen K. v. Robert
B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1984). At least one
commentator has recognized an inconsistency in permitting claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for genital herpes transmission. His rationale for
denying such an action is based on the clear presence of physical contact in STD
cases. See Note, Kathleen K. v. Robert B.: A Cause of Action for Genital Herpes
Transmission, 34 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 498, 518 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Genital
Herpes Transmission]. Instead, the author suggests, as does comment b to § 46 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, that "emotional distress is more properly an item
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To state a claim for fraud in Maryland, the plaintiff must allege the
following five elements: (1) that a representation made by the defendant
was false; (2) that either the falsity of such representation was known to
the defendant or the misrepresentation was made with such reckless indifference to the truth as to impute such knowledge to him; (3) that the
misrepresentation was made for the purpose of defrauding the plaintiff;
(4) that the plaintiff not only relied upon the misrepresentation, but also
had the right to rely upon it with full belief of its truth, and that he
would not have done the thing from which damage resulted if the misrepresentation had not been made; and (5) that the plaintiff suffered damage directly resulting from the misrepresentation. 30
Three forms of fraudulent misrepresentation exist in the context of
liability for transmission of an STD.31 First, the transmitter may offer an
intentional, affirmative representation that he is free from disease, knowing that he is infected. 32 Second, the transmitter may offer a negligent,
affirmative misrepresentation, such as when a person, who has experienced symptoms that should put him on notice that he is diseased, inof damages flowing from the injury itself." Note, Genital Herpes Transmission,
supra at 518-19 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment b
(1965».
30. See Suburban Properties Mgmt, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 Md. 455, 460, 204 A.2d 326,
329 (1964). Although courts traditionally have limited the tort of misrepresentation
to commercial settings, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 comment h
(1977), there are a limited number of cases imposing liability for fraud resulting in
physical injury to an innocent victim in a noncommercial setting. See, e.g.,
Maharam v. Maharam, 123 A.D.2d 165, 510 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1986) (recognizing
wife's claim for fraud against husband who had infected her with herpes); Kathleen
K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992,994, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 274 (1984) (similar);
see also 31 ATLA L. REP. 203, 206 (June 1988); Comment, Genital Herpes and the
Law, supra note 15, at 130-32.
31. An essential element of fraudulent misrepresentation is scienter on the part of the
defendant. This requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's SUbjective intent
was to mislead the plaintiff through a representation the defendant knew to be false.
Proof of actual intent to deceive is paramount. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13,
at 741. Regarding scienter, it is unclear whether an intention to mislead for the
establishment of scienter includes a partner's representation based upon an uncertain belief that he is free from disease. Some courts have found the scienter element
satisfied when a defendant asserts a fact which he has no knowledge to believe is
true. Harris v. Delco Products Co., 305 Mass. 362, 25 N.E.ld 740 (1940); see generally Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an Intent to Deceive, 5 UCLA L. REV. 583,
592-93 (1958).
When the plaintiff is lacking sufficient facts to establish the defendant's intent
to deceive, an alternative theory of recovery may be found in a cause of action for
negligent misrepresentation. Hence, a defendant, who honestly but erroneously believes himself to be free from disease, and who infects an innocent victim who relied
on his representation, will be deemed negligent if he failed to exercise reasonable
care in ascertaining the facts relied on in making his representation. See Alice D. v.
William M., 113 Misc. 2d 940, 450 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1982). For a comprehensive
discussion of deceit and negligent misrepresentation, see Note, Genital Herpes
Transmission, supra note 29, at 519-29.
32. Kathleen K., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 994, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274, involved such an
affirmative misrepresentation of fact.
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forms a partner that he is free of disease. 33 Finally, the transmitter may
offer no information whatsoever to a partner regarding his infection,
when, in fact, he knew of his infected condition. 34
The leading case in the area of tort liability for the sexual transmission of disease is Kathleen K. v. Robert B. 35 In that case, the plaintiff
stated viable causes of action sounding in negligence, battery, intentional
infliction of emotional distress and fraud against a defendant who infected her with genital herpes. 36 In reaching its decision, the California
Court of Appeals relied on the reasoning of a prior California Court of
Appeals ruling, Barbara A. v. John G., 37 in which the court held that a
plaintiff who seeks damages for severe injury to his own body may state a
valid cause of action against the person who caused the injury.38
The Kathleen K. court dismissed the precedential value of Stephen
K v. Ron; L. ,39 in which the court refused to "encourage unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters affecting the individual's right to
privacy [by] supervis[ing] the promises made between two consenting
adults as to the circumstances of their private sexual conduct."40
In distinguishing the court of appeals' holding in Stephen K., the
Kathleen K court noted that the policy concerns at issue in a "wrongful
birth" action (such as Stephen K.) involve the birth of a healthy child,
where no physical injury is sustained by either parent. 41 Thus, the court
expanded its prior holding in Barbara A. by recognizing all four of Kathleen K.'s causes of action. Since the decision in Kathleen K., a flurry of
suits have been instituted upon similar legal theories for the transmission
of STDs, and appellate courts entertaining such claims have consistently
ruled in the plaintiffs' favor. 42
33. Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29 at 522·23. If the transmitter has
made an affirmative misrepresentation that he is free from disease, the plaintiff may
plead in the alternative that the defendant acted either intentionally or negligently,
allowing the trier of fact to determine the truth of such allegations. Id. See also
supra notes 25 & 31.
34. See, e.g., Maharam, 123 A.D.2d at 170, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 107. In this case, the wife
made out a claim for actionable fraud against her husband, who had infected her
with herpes after concealing that he had the disease. The court concluded that the
marital relationship imposed a duty upon the husband to alert his wife that he was
infected with the disease. Id. See also Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra
note 29, at 523·29.
35. 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
36. /d. at 994, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274. The California court provided few facts in its
opinion, noting only that the plaintiff contracted genital herpes by way of sexual
intercourse with the defendant. Id. at 993-94, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
37. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983).
38. Id. at 996-97, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 276.
39. 105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980).
40. Id. at 644-45, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620.
41. 150 Cal. App. 3d at 995, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 275.
42. See R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988); Maharam v.
Maharam, 123 A.D.2d 165, 519 N.Y.S.2d 104 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986); S.A.V. v.
K.G.V., 708 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. 1986) (en bane); Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538,
333 S.E.2d 852 (1985).
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In B.N. v. K.K. ,43 the plaintiff, Ms. N., was employed as a nurse at
Johns Hopkins University Hospital. For four months, Ms. N. was involved in an intimate relationship with the defendant, Dr. K., a physician
at the hospital. During their relationship, the couple engaged in sexual
intercourse at a time when Dr. K. knew he was experiencing an active
outbreak of genital herpes. Ms. N. neither was aware of Dr. K.'s condition, nor did she have any reason to suspect that he was infected with the
herpes virus. 44 As a result of their sexual contact, Ms. N. contracted
genital herpes. 45
On a question certified by the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland,46 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that,
upon a proper factual showing, Maryland recognizes causes of action for
negligence, for fraud, and for intentional infliction of emotional distress
arising from the sexual transmission of a dangerous, contagious, and incurable disease such as genital herpes. 47
The court of appeals, in recognizing Ms. No's actions for negligence,
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, noted that traditional tort and criminal law concepts frequently have been applied to
impose liability for transmission of contagious diseases. 48
The court addressed each of the three causes of action individually.
Its discussion of negligence focused on the transmitter's duty and on
foreseeability.49 The court concluded that everyone bears the responsibility to exercise due care to avoid unreasonable risk of harm to others. 50
43.
44.
45.
46.

47.

48.

49.
50.

312 Md. 135, 538 A.2d 1175 (1988).
Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1177.
/d. at 138-39, 538 A.2d at 1177.
The issues presented by the plaintiff's complaint were certified pursuant to the
Maryland Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC.
CODE ANN. §§ 12-601 to -609 (1984). The certified question was: "Does Maryland
Recognize A Cause of Action for Either Fraud, Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress, Or Negligence Resulting From the Sexual Transmission Of A Dangerous,
Contagious, and Incurable Disease, Such As Genital Herpes?" 312 Md. at 137-38,
538 A.2d at 1176. All facts asserted in the plaintiff's complaint were assumed sufficient for the purpose of ruling on the certified question. Id. at 138, 538 A.2d at
1177.
Id., 538 A.2d at 1176. The plaintiff's complaint contained four counts: fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, and assault and battery. Id. at
139, 538 A.2d at 1177. Because of a limitations problem, the plaintiff's assault and
battery count was not before the court of appeals. Id. at 139 n.I, 538 A.2d at 1177
n.l. Moreover, the court entertained the causes of action in a different order than
they were presented for consideration. The reason for this, apparently, was the
court's need to establish the duty element for the plaintiff's fraud count. Survey,
Developments in Maryland Law, 1987-88: Torts, 48 MD. L. REV. 844, 848 n.50
(1989); see also supra note 46.
312 Md. at 139, 538 A.2d at 1177. See, e.g., Smith v. Baker, 20 F. 709 (S.D.N. Y.
1884) (whooping cough); Hendricks v. Butcher, 144 Mo. App. 671, 129 S.W. 431
(1910) (smallpox); Earle v. Kuklo, 26 N.J. Super. 471, 98 A.2d 107 (1953)
(tuberculosis).
312 Md. at 141-42, 538 A.2d at 1178.
/d. at 141,538 A.2d at 1178; see also Moran v. Faberge, 273 Md. 538, 543, 332 A.2d
11, 15 (1975).
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In defining the duty owed to the plaintiff, the court relied on the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 435(2), which defines the realm of legal causation. 51 Thus, liability would attach only "if it appears highly likely that
the conduct in question should have brought about the harm."52 Liability would not attach, however, if "it appears 'highly extraordinary' that
the negligent conduct should have brought about the harm."53
The application of negligence concepts to a sexual transmission situation implies that a person infected with a disease such as genital herpes
has a duty to disclose his illness to all who are likely to be injured. As
the court of appeals stated, "the infected person has a duty to take reasonable precautions-whether by warning others or by avoiding contact
with them-to avoid transmitting the disease."54 In the context of sexually transmitted diseases, liability rests in the transmitter's duty to exercise due care so as not to injure another. 55 Accordingly, for a court to
find a defendant liable for transmission of a sexually communicable disease, the defendant, at very least, must recognize that he is diseased in
some manner. 56 In the absence of such knowledge, or, in the absence of a
reason on the part of the transmitter to know of his infection, liability
would not attach. 57
51. That section of the Restatement provides: "The actor's conduct may be held not to
be a legal cause of harm to another where after the event and looking back from the
harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary
that it should have brought about the harm." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 435(2) (1965).
52. 312 Md. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1178.
53. Id. at 141-42, 538 A.2d at 1178 (quoting Henley v. Prince George's County, 305
Md. 320, 334, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340 (1986)).
54. Id. at 142, 538 A.2d at 1179.
55. See Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 513.
56. Id. at 514; see also Cook v. Cook, 32 N.J. Eq. 475, 480 (1880).
57. People are presumed, however, to have a basic level of knowledge or common sense.
See Note, Negligence-Knowledge-Minimum Standard 0/ Knowledge-Duty to
Know, 23 MINN. L. REV. 628, 633-37 (1939). Thus, if a defendant has open, oozing
genital sores, he should be deemed to possess the requisite knowledge, whether or
not he is aware that it is genital herpes. Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra,
note 29, at 514-15.
In C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals of Minnesota dealt with a cause of action for negligent transmission of the
AIDS virus by a man who allegedly had engaged in homosexual activity. The
defendant's
knowledge only consisted of what he perceived at the time of [his] relationship [with the plaintiff], coupled with his memory and experience, concerning the transmission of AIDS. It is required only that [the
defendant's] perception be reasonable under the circumstances, and he is
not expected to perceive what is not apparent.
[d. at 443. Looking at the information available to the general public at the time the
parties ended their sexual contact, the spring of 1985, the court determined that it
was not reasonable for the defendant to have constructive knowledge that he might
have AIDS or was capable of transmitting the disease to his fiancee. [d. at 444. In
the spring of 1985, the local news indicated only that (I) few persons in Minnesota
had contracted AIDS, (2) AIDS was associated primarily with homosexuals and
intraveneous drug users, and (3) there was a belief that AIDS was transmitted
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In addressing Ms. N.'s negligence count, the court noted that Ms.
N. was a "clearly identified potential victim" of Dr. K.'s infection.58 Ms.
N. alleged that Dr. K., knowing he had active herpes-a highly contagious, sexually transmitted disease-had sexual intercourse with her. 59
Thus, Dr. K. owed a duty to Ms. N.60
Ms. N.'s complaint sufficiently established that Dr. K. breached his
duty to her by infecting her with a serious, painful, and incurable disease
while having knowledge that the disease was active and in a highly contagious state. 61 The court held that Ms. N. stated a cause of action in
negligence under Maryland law because she alleged facts showing that
Dr. K. owed her a duty to take reasonable precautions,62 that Dr. K.
breached that duty by failing to warn Ms. N. of his condition, and that
Ms. N. contracted genital herpes which was proximately caused by Dr.
K.'s failure to warn or take precautions. 63
The court of appeals next addressed the viability of Ms. N.'s action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 64 After stating the elements of that tort,65 the court applied the facts alleged by Ms. N. to those
elements. Because Dr. K. knew he had active herpes, recognized the
dangerous, contagious, and incurable nature of the disease, and engaged
in sexual intercourse with Ms. N., the court of appeals deemed his conduct intentional or reckless. 66
After considering the characteristics of genital herpes,67 the court
easily concluded that transmission of the disease was substantially certhrough blood or semen. Furthermore, there was no publicly available AIDS test.
Id. Presumably, the court would not reach the same conclusion today given the
manner in which the public has been inundated with information about AIDS and
its transmission. See supra notes 5-6.
58. 312 Md. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179.
59. Id. at 138-39, 538 A.2d at 1177.
60.Id.
61. Id. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179.
62. It is unclear from the court's holding in B.N. when such a legal duty on the part of
one infected with an STD actually arises. In the case of genital herpes, the duty
may arise only when it is active, and thus transmittable. But see infra note 15. In
the case of AIDS, however, the duty to disclose may always be present simply because the disease is transmittable even when there is no manifestation of physical
symptoms. Understanding AIDS, supra note 5, at 5.
63. 312 Md. at 143, 538 A.2d at 1179. For a comprehensive listing of law review commentaries discussing the applicability of negligence principles to the transmission of
genital herpes, see id. at 143-44, 538 A.2d at 1179.
64. Id. at 144-49, 538 A.2d at 1179-82.
65. See supra notes 13-34 and accompanying text.
66. 312 Md. at 144, 538 A.2d at 1180. Because the facts presented by Ms. N. irrefutably established scienter on the part of Dr. K, it was not difficult for the court to find
the facts alleged sufficient to establish fraud. In the future, courts will confront the
more difficult burden of defining the bounds of negligent misrepresentations in the
STD context. See supra note 31.
67. The court noted that: "Genital herpes is a contagious, painful, and incurable disease that is spread by sexual contact. It is an infectious disease that endangers public health." 312 Md. at 139-41, 538 A.2d at 1177-78; see also supra notes 2-3.
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tain to produce severe emotional distress 68 and that Dr. K.'s conduct
was extreme and outrageous. 69 The court also noted that if the facts of
Ms. N.'s complaint could be established as alleged, then "[t]he causal
connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress is
apparent .... "70
Although the court relied on cases from other jurisdictions to support a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress,'! it
emphasized that a plaintiff may recover only upon a showing that severe
emotional distress resulted.'2 Nonetheless, by stating that "[t]he nature
of the conduct itself may provide evidence of the severity of the distress,"73 the court allows the trier of fact to analyze the defendant's conduct in addition to the plaintiff's injury. Giving B.N. v. KK. a broad
reading, one can conclude that the court has eliminated the severity element of the tort in favor of a consideration of the objective physical condition, rather than the SUbjective mental state, of the plaintiff. 74
The court of appeals next addressed the viability of Ms. N.'s cause
of action for fraud, deceit, or intentional misrepresentation,7S and noted
that liability may exist for physical harm caused by a fraudulent misrepresentation.'6 Ms. N. alleged that Dr. K. concealed the existence of genital herpes, rather than asserting that he was free from disease. The court
then determined whether Dr. K. had a duty to inform Ms. N. of his
68. The court noted, however, that emotional distress need not produce total physical
or emotional disablement to be severe. Id. at 148, 538 A.2d at 1181. Not only had
Ms. N. alleged the painful and incurable aspects of genital herpes, but the court sua
sponte added that:
[The disease] is associated with the development of cervical cancer, with
the dangers of miscarriage and premature delivery during childbirth, and
with a high mortality rate for children, born of mothers who have the
disease, who thereby contract herpes at birth. Furthermore, one who has
the disease should at a minimum refrain from sexual relations while the
disease is in its active stages.
312 Md. at 145, 538 A.2d at 1180 (footnote omitted).
Furthermore, the court recognized the cold reality that a person with genital
herpes "may be deprived of most normal sexual activity, marriage may be virtually
out of the question, and vaginal childbearing may be practically ruled out." Id.
69. Id. at 144-45, 538 A.2d at 1180.
70. Id. at 147, 538 A.2d at 1181.
71. Id. at 148, 538 A.2d at 1182 (citing Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992,
198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984) and Long v. Adams, 175 Ga. App. 538, 333 S.E.2d 852
(1985».
72. 312 Md. at 148-49,538 A.2d at 1182.
73. Id. (footnote omitted).
74. The court did make an effort, however, to distinguish transmission of genital herpes
from "mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities." Id. at 146, 538 A.2d at 1181 (quoting Harris v. Jones, 281 Md. 560, 567,
380 A.2d 611, 614 (1977». Thus, the court appears to have continued in its resolve
to prevent the unbridled application of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress.
75. 312 Md. at 149, 538 A.2d at 1182.
76. Id. at 150, 538 A.2d at 1182 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 554,
557A (1977».
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disease, noting that "concealment cannot be the basis of an action in
deceit if there is no duty to speak."77 In determining whether a duty
existed, the court looked to the confidential nature of the relationship
between Ms. N. and Dr. K.78
The court refused to conclude that only a marital relationship imposes a duty upon a partner to disclose that sexual relations are likely to
transmit a contagious disease. Instead, the court described the nature of
a confidential relationship as "whether one party justifiably placed confidence in the other and whether the other accepted the placement."79
Quoting Kathleen K., Judge Adkins, speaking for the court, stated "a
certain amount of trust and confidence exists in any intimate relationship. "80 Thus, "an ongoing 'intimate boyfriend-girlfriend relationship'
may give rise to a duty to speak under circumstances" like those alleged
by Ms. N.81
Not only did the court refuse to limit liability to married individuals, but also the court dismissed the need for any confidential
relationship.
Dr. K. had a general tort duty, at the least, to disclose his condition before engaging in intercourse with [Ms. N.] .... That
is, whether the relationship between Ms. N. and Dr. K. was
"confidential" in the eyes of the law or whether it was not, it
was a relationship which had to make Dr. K. aware that to
engage in sexual intercourse with Ms. N. without disclosing his
condition would be highly likely to produce severe harm to a
readily and clearly identifiable person. 82
By eliminating the need for a confidential relationship, the court opened
the door to fraud claims brought by anyone infected by a knowing carrier
of a dangerous, contagious, and incurable STD such as genital herpes, so
long as the transmitter could foresee infecting another with the disease.
Because the certified question presented to the court of appeals in
B.N v. K.K. was limited to the facts and issues presented in Ms. N.'s
complaint, the court left unanswered how Maryland courts would treat
(1) suits brought for the transmission of other STDs such as AIDS, (2)
intentional tort actions for assault and battery,83 and (3) the applicability
77. 312 Md. at 151, 538 A.2d at 1183.
78.Id.
79.Id.
80. Id. at 153, 538 A.2d at 1184 (quoting Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d
992, 997, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77 (1984».
81. Id. at 153, 538 A.2d at 1184.
82. Id. (citation omitted). This statement emphasizes the court's focus on foreseeability. It is the relationship as sexual partners between the plaintiff and the defendant
which makes it foreseeable to the defendant that severe harm may result to the
plaintiff from sexual intercourse. Therefore, any sexual partner is a foreseeable victim. The nature of the relationship, beyond the sexual relationship, is immaterial to
the imposition of liability.
83. See supra note 46.
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of the various defenses to both negligence and intentional tort actions for
transmission of STDs.
The question presented to the court of appeals was not limited to
genital herpes; rather it dealt with the "Sexual Transmission Of A Dangerous, Contagious, and Incurable Disease, Such As Genital Herpes."84
Although the court of appeals was willing to impose liability for the
transmission of herpes between two heterosexual partners, it is unclear
how Maryland courts would respond to a suit for transmission of a potentially less visible disease such as AIDS. It is possible that upon a
showing of intentional conduct, a court easily could apply existing common law precedent to find a defendant to possess the requisite degree of
knowledge and intent for liability to be imposed. 8s
More problematic for the courts, however, are negligence cases in
which the plaintiff has not alleged the defendant's actual knowledge of
his condition. Instead, a negligence claim may be grounded upon the
proposition that a reasonable person should have known of his infected
condition and should have warned his partner of the risks of having sexual relations. 86 Whether the defendant's actions were reasonable is a
question for the fact finder. 87
In determining whether a defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff, it is
unclear to what extent a court may deem the defendant to possess the
requisite knowledge. Diseases have various levels of symptomatic indication, requiring varying levels of investigation to identify their presence.
A person infected with the AIDS virus may transmit the disease while he
possesses no physical manifestations. 88 Yet, medical research has shown
84. 312 Md. at 138, 538 A.2d at 1176 (emphasis added).
85. Actual or implied knowledge by a defendant of his ability to transmit a disease is
directly tied to his ability to ascertain his infected condition. In many instances,
physical symptoms are the primary means of gaining such knowledge.
86. See generally Comment, AIDS Transmission, supra note 14.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 285(d) (1965). The medical facts to be
weighed in this regard are frequently too complex for a jury to evaluate in the absence of expert testimony. Even with the aid of expert testimony, uncertainties in
the medical and scientific communities on the issue of the time between exposure to
the HIV virus and the date when physical symptoms or even antibodies to the virus
develop are significant. Compare Friedland, AIDS: General Overview, supra note 4,
at 681 (time period between exposure to the HTLV-III virus and seroconversion is
one to six months) with Darrow, Lui & Rutherford, A Model-Based Estimate of the
Mean Incubation Period for AIDS in Homosexual Men, 240 SCIENCE 1333 (June 3,
1988) ("the mean incubation period for AIDS in homosexual men is 7.8 years ... ,
which is close to the estimate of 8.2 years for adults developing transfusion-associated AIDS."). See also Imagawa, et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1
Infection in Homosexual Men Who Remain Seronegative for Prolonged Periods, 320
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1458 (June I, 1989). Thus, the credibility of the expert will be
an important ingredient in the jury's determination.
88. Understanding AIDS, supra note 5, at 5; see also Haseltine, Silent HIV Infections,
320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1487, 1488 (June I, 1988) (There is "the sobering possibility that HIV -1 infections may be transmitted by blood and organ donors who are
silently infected. ").
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that certain groups are at a higher risk of being infected. 89 The question
of duty, therefore, may hinge on whether a person falling within one of
these high risk groups possesses the requisite degree of knowledge of his
potential condition. 90
It is unclear from the court's opinion in B.N. v. K.K., and from case
law in other jurisdictions, whether mere high risk activity is sufficient to
put a defendant on notice that he may be infected with an STD. Common sense dictates that such activity may be the legal equivalent of a
physical manifestation of a disease, and thus requires a defendant to
warn his sexual partner of possible transmission. 91 Given the dangerous,
contagious, and incurable nature of AIDS, and the danger to public
health, there is no reason why a court, confronted with a claim for tortious transmission of AIDS, should not apply traditional tort concepts in
the same manner as in genital herpes cases to find a defendant liable.
In Maryland, a battery is the consummation of an unlawful attempt
to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another person or to qause
an apprehension of such a contact.92 The defendant's intent to do harm
is not an essential element of battery.93
A cause of action in battery brought for the transmission of a sexually communicable disease is problematic due to the consensual nature of
sexual relations. 94 The plaintiff's consent to the initial act of sexual in89. Former Surgeon General of the United States, C. Everett Koop, M.D., Sc.D., has
stated that the following activities constitute "risky behavior":
Sharing drug needles and syringes. Anal sex, with or without a condom.
Vaginal or oral sex with someone who shoots drugs or engages in anal sex.
Sex with someone you don't know well (a pickup or prostitute) or with
someone you know has several sex partners. Unprotected sex (without a
condom) with an infected person.
Understanding AIDS, supra note 5, at 3.
90. Whether a sexual partner who is not at high risk and is not infected with an STD
has a corresponding duty to ask his partner whether the partner is a member of a
high risk group, or at very least, to request permission to inspect a partner's body
for signs of STD infection, is an issue which suggests possible contributory negligence, and, in some jurisdictions, comparative negligence. Although these defenses
may successfully be employed in a given case, discussion of their use is beyond the
scope of this Note. For a discussion of the issues surrounding both defenses, see
Comment, AIDS Transmission, supra note 14, at 719; Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 529-31.
91. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
92. Continental Casualty Co. v. Mirable, 52 Md. App. 387, 398, 449 A.2d 1176,1183,
cert. denied, 294 Md. 652 (1982); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 13, 18 (1965).
93. "The gist of the action is not hostile intent on the part of the defendant, but the
absence of consent to the contact on the plaintiff's part." Ghassemieh v. Schafer, 52
Md. App. 31, 38-39, 447 A.2d 84, 88 (1982)(citation omitted). Moreover, "[t]he
concepts of negligence andbattery are not mutually exclusive." Id. at 40, 447 A.2d
at 89 (citation omitted). Thus, an individual is not foreclosed from bringing causes
of action for both battery and negligence. Id. at 42-43, 447 A.2d at 89-90.
94. Consent to the invasion of the plaintiff's interest usually vitiates the existence of a
battery because the defendant's act is no longer wrongful. PROSSER ON TORTS,
supra note 21, at 101. The defendant's privilege is lost, however, if the act to which
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tercourse, however, should not preclude a subsequent action for battery
upon ascertaining the true character of the defendant's act, i.e., the transmission of an infectious disease. 95 Instead, this problem is avoided by
"conceptualizing the physical contact between plaintiff and defendant as
two separate touchings: one, the sexual touching, which was within the
plaintiff's consent, the other, contamination with the [STD], which was
not due to the plaintiff's ignorance of the disease."96 Additionally, a defendant's fraudulent concealment of the risk of infection with a venereal
disease may vitiate the plaintiff's consent to sexual intercourse. 97 This
reasoning was applied in Kathleen K. 9~
Maryland courts easily can overcome any problems presented by the
consent defense to a battery action arising from the transmission of an
STD by following the lead of Kathleen K. By distinguishing the consensual contact of sexual intercourse from the contact resulting in the trans- .
mission of the venereal disease, Maryland courts can safeguard the public
health rather than punish the plaintiff for engaging in sexual relations.
Just as courts impose no duty on a plaintiff to anticipate the negligence of
the defendant, Maryland courts should not impute consent to a plaintiff
for infection with a disease absent some readily identifiable signal given
by the defendant,99 or his condition, that suggests the presence of such a
riskYlO Upon a proper factual showing, it appears that Maryland courts

95.

96.

97.

98.
99.
100.

the plaintiff was exposed deviated substantially from the act to which the plaintiff
originally consented. In such a case, the defendant will be deemed to have exceeded
the plaintiff's consent. See Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905),
overruled on other grounds, Genzel v. Halvorson, 248 Minn. 527, 80 N.W.2d 854
(1957); see also PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 118-19.
Closely analogous to the issue of consent in a battery action for the transmission of
an STD is the doctrine of informed consent. Under that doctrine, the plaintiff typically alleges that a physician or other health care provider failed to disclose potential risk, however slight, of a particular procedure, and therefore deprived the
plaintiff of the opportunity to deny treatment, which he would have done had he
known of the risk. For an excellent discussion of informed consent, see Sard v.
Hardy, 281 Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014 (1977); see also Note, Court ofAppeals of Maryland Adopts Doctrine of Informed Consent, 8 U. BALT. L. REV. 114 (1978).
Although most jurisdictions treat informed consent cases as negligence actions,
a minority of courts have allowed recovery upon a battery theory. See generally,
Schultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95
YALE L.J. 219 (1985).
Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 511-12, n.114 (citing State v.
Lankford, 29 Del. (6 Boyce) 594, 595, 102 A. 63, 64 (1917».
See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 997,198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276-77
(1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B, illustration 5 (1979) (Where
"A consents to sexual intercourse with B, who knows that A is ignorant of the fact
that B has a venereal disease B is subject to liability to A for battery."); Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 511-12.
150 Cal. App. 3d at 997,198 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77.
Courts and commentators have not yet expressed an opinion on the scope of "readily identifiable signal" for the purpose of finding a plaintiff contributorily negligent
in engaging in sexual relations with the defendant. But see supra note 57.
In the context of genital herpes, the presence of open, oozing genital sores may serve
as a sufficiently reliable signal. See Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note
29, at 514 and accompanying text. An individual infected with AIDS, on the other
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could implement existing tort principles and the rationale of other jurisdictions to recognize a cause of action in battery for the transmission of
any sexually transmitted disease. 101
In addition to the issues presented by a battery action for transmission of an STD, the limited nature of the certified question also denied
the court of appeals the opportunity to address possible defenses to the
causes of action before it. 102 A defendant may introduce several defenses
to an action for intentional or negligent transmission of a sexually transmitted disease. A defendant could raise defenses such as assumption of
the risk, the right of privacy, statute of limitations, implied notice, interspousal immunity, or illegal sexual conduct.
Assumption of the risk is a defense used by a defendant who alleges
that the plaintiff, aware of the risk associated with the sexual contact at
issue, nevertheless proceeded to the plaintiff's detriment. In Maryland, a
defendant must establish three elements before the plaintiff is deemed to
have assumed a risk of injury. "The defendant must show that the plaintiff (1) had knowledge of the risk of danger, (2) appreciated the risk and
(3) voluntarily exposed himself to it."103 Upon proof by a defendant that
the plaintiff assumed the risk, the plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned
his right to maintain an action. 104
A primary issue involving the assumption of the risk defense in the
context of a suit for the transmission of an STD is whether the plaintiff
possessed the requisite knowledge of the likely effects associated with the
sexual contact with the defendant. 105 If the defendant can prove that the
plaintiff was fully aware of the risk, the assumption of risk defense may
succeed. If, on the other hand, the defendant merely asserts that the
plaintiff should have known of the existence of the defendant's condition
and the possibility of being infected, it becomes a question of fact
whether the plaintiff was in a position whereby he should have recognized the dangerous consequences of contact with the defendant.
It is questionable whether a defendant successfully can employ the
implied assumption of risk defense to a negligence action for infliction of
an STD. Individuals are under no duty to anticipate the negligent conduct of others,106 and "[t]he only way such a duty to anticipate could

101.

102.
103.
104.

105.
106.

hand, may live for several years without any physical manifestations of the infection. Understanding AIDS, supra note 5, at 5.
B.N. v. K.K., 312 Md. at 139 n.2, 538 A.2d at 1177 n.2 (citing Crowell v. Crowell,
180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920)).
See supra note 47.
Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md. 619, 630, 495 A.2d 838, 843 (1985)
(quoting Stancill v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 744 F.2d 861, 866 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(footnote omitted)).
Pfaff v. Yacht Basin Co., 58 Md. App. 348,355-56,473 A.2d 479, 483 (1984) (citations omitted).
See Comment, Herpes-A Legal Cure-Can the Law Succeed Where Medicine has
Failed?, 61 J. URB. L. 273, 284-85 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Herpes-A Legal
Cure].
Note, Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 530.
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arise would be if the danger of herpes were widespread and a large segment of the general public could recognize the physical manifestation of
a herpetic outbreak."107
Courts may not take the same approach when confronted with a
cause of action for the transmission of an STD such as AIDS. Following
years of constant warnings from the government, medical community,
and media, members of designated "high risk groups" may find themselves unable to claim that they were unaware of the particular risks of
engaging in high risk activities.108 Furthermore, the present stigma associated with AIDS and the socially unacceptable means by which the virus can be communicated may cause courts to "interfere less" with the
personal choices of the partners, which, in turn, may cause the courts to
take a different approach in ruling on the applicability of implied assumption of risk.
As AIDS becomes more commonplace in the heterosexual community,I09 the question remains whether courts will apply implied assumption of risk to cases involving transmission of the AIDS virus between
non-monogomous heterosexual partners. The relationship between the
parties is an important factor in defining the risk assumed. I10 Nevertheless, parties to a "one night stand," who arguably expect little from the
relationship and one another, should be held to the same high duty of
accountability. The needs of society in protecting itself from the devastating effects of STDs should cause courts to disallow any inference that
plaintiffs should not expect defendants to act reasonably.
Genital herpes is one of the more visible venereal diseases. III
Others such as gonorrhea 1l2 and AIDS, however, are less easily identifiable, and one infected with either of these diseases may be more likely to
attribute the symptoms to other, more common causes such as the flu or
simple skin irritation. l13 This gives rise to the more fundamental question of whether any physical symptom suggesting possible infection with
a communicable disease creates a duty on the part of the defendant to
107.Id.
108. See generally Understanding AIDS, supra note 5; see also supra note 89.
109. See generally MMWR HIV Infection in the u.s., supra note 2, at 344.
110. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 481.
Ill. But see Wheeler, The Herpes Simplex Problem, supra note 2, at 163, "[A] significant
percentage of persons who have seropositive results for herpes simplex virus are not
aware of having had clinical herpetic infections. Their infections have been either
asymptomatic or subclinical, not diagnosed, ignored, or misdiagnosed."
112. Gonorrhea is a contagious viral infection producing symptoms in the genital mucous membranes of men and women. The typical male symptoms include discharge
from the penis and painful urination. In women, the labia and urethral canal become irritated and tender. The most profound symptoms may appear shortly after
infection and then subside. TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC MEDICAL DICTIONARY G-29 to
G-30 (lith ed. 1970). Even upon dissipation of symptoms, an individual may remain infectious for several weeks. Id.
113. Symptoms commonly associated with AIDS Related Complex (ARC), a condition
where the HIV antibody is present in the blood but where the symptoms associated
with full blown AIDS are absent, can be as mild as a slight temperature, diarrhea,
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warn a partner of the possibility that the symptoms are linked to an
STD.114
A defendant faced with a suit for transmission of an STD also may
assert a right to privacy as a defense. The right to privacy protects individuals from unwarranted government intrusion into their personal
lives. lls Although defendants sued in tort for transmitting an STD have
asserted the right to privacy defense, courts consistently have denied its
sufficiency on the ground that while "the constitutional right to privacy
normally shields sexual relations from judicial scrutiny, it does not do so
where the right to privacy is used as a shield from liability at the expense
of the other party." I 16 Other courts reason that public policy considerations of community health outweigh the privacy interest that may be violated. 117 In light of the court of appeals' rationale for placing liability on
the defendant in B.N. v. K.K., it is probable that Maryland courts would
deny the use of a right to privacy defense in favor of more fundamental
considerations of public health and welfare. 118
A defense that invariably may present itself for use in tort actions is
the running of the statute of limitations. The issues surrounding the statute of limitations defense are as problematic in the context of sexually
transmitted diseases as they are in medical malpractice and products liability actions involving toxic drugs or chemicals, in which the statute of
limitations may run even before the defendant becomes aware of the injury inflicted upon him.119 In Maryland, as in many other states, a plaintiff alleging personal injury arising out of the tortious conduct of another
generally must bring suit within three years of the injurious conduct. 12o
The defendant's successful use of the statute of limitations defense
will depend upon which theory the court relies on to start the running of
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115.
116.
117.

118.
119.
120.

weight loss, and swollen glands. Friedland, AIDS: General Overview, supra note 4,
at 682.
A first episode of genital herpes is characterized by "fever, headache, malaise,
and myalgias. Pain, itching, dysuria, vaginal and urethral discharge . . . are the
predominant local symptoms." Infections with HSV (Part II.), supra note 3, at 750;
see also Comment, Herpes: Liability to Third Parties, supra note 14, at 795-96.
One commentator takes the argument one step further and proposes that an infected
individual who warns his partner of the danger of contracting an STD, but fails to
explain to his partner the potential health consequences of the disease, should be
deemed negligent in failing to advise in this regard. Comment, Herpes-A Legal
Cure, supra note 105, at 284-85.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Barbara A. v. John G., 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 385, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422, 433 (1983).
R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (those afflicted with
sexually communicable diseases are in the best position to prevent their spread, and
the public's interest in preventing the spread of incurable diseases justifies some invasion into personal privacy); Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 99697, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273, 276 (1984).
For further discussion of the issues surrounding the right to privacy in the context
ofSTDs, see Comment, Genital Herpes and the Law, supra note 15, at 138-39; Note,
Genital Herpes Transmission, supra note 29, at 531-32.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 165-68.
MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-101 (1984).
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the statute. Some jurisdictions hold firm to the rule that the statute of
limitations begins to run at the time of the negligent act or omission,
which in the context of the transmission of an STD is the sexual contact
itself.
In jurisdictions following the discovery rule, the statute will not begin to run until the plaintiff either knew or should have known of the
defendant's negligent conduct. Although there is no written opinion discussing the applicability of a statute of limitations defense to an action
for the transmission of a venereal disease, there is ample common law
precedent addressing the statute of limitations issues in other contexts to
justify a court's application of the discovery rule in an STD case.t21
The statute of limitations should not present a serious problem in an
action for transmission of genital herpes, since physical symptoms of
HSV infection manifest themselves within a short time after initial exposure. 122 In AIDS transmission cases, however, it is quite possible that
physical symptoms will not manifest themselves for many years. Several
scientific studies suggest that the time between the date of initial HIV
exposure and the date symptoms appear which are significant enough for
an individual to suspect that he has AIDS can range from four and one
half to eight years. 123 Also unresolved is the question whether the presence of HIV antibodies, without actual manifestation of physical symptoms, constitutes sufficient injury to commence the running of the statute
of limitations. 124 It is plausible that mere knowledge of the presence of
the antibody in one's blood is sufficient notice that a partner's negligence
was the source of exposure. 125
121. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 13, at 167 nn. 23-24.
122. "The incubation period [for HSV] ranges from I to 26 days (median 6 to 8 days)."
Corey & Spear, Infections with Herpes Simplex Viruses (Part II.), 314 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 686, 690 (March 13, 1986). At least one study suggests, however, that the
herpes simplex virus cervicitis, which afflicts a large portion of women with HSV-II
of the external genitalia, can be transmitted through vaginal excretion "without evidence of genital lesions." Corey, Adams, Brown & Holmes, Genital Herpes Simplex
Virus Infections: Clinical Manifestations, Course, and Complications, 98 ANNALS
OF INTERNAL MED. 958, 961 (1983).
123. Friedland & Klein, Transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 317 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 278, 278 (July 30, 1987); but see supra note 87. Although the HIV
antibody may develop in the blood much sooner than the appearance of physical
symptoms, it is questionable whether a plaintiff would have the requisite knowledge
of his exposure in the absence of conclusive test results. See C.A.U. v. R.L., 438
N.W.2d 441 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
124. One commentator has suggested that the presence of the HIV antibodies is sufficient
to constitute an actionable injury, and that the development of full-blown AIDS is
not necessary. Comment, AIDS Transmission, supra note 14, at 715-16. One can
draw analogies from this reasoning to support a contention that the seroconversion
is an injury for the purpose of commencing the running of the statute of limitations.
125. Id. As courts expand the gamut of actionable wrongs, the plaintiff must remain
keenly aware that sustaining even the slightest injury may commence the running of
the statute of limitations. A plaintiff infected with HIV, who has not developed the
physical symptoms associated with AIDS, may suffer emotional damage upon learning of his infected condition out of fear that the full effects of the disease will inevitably develop. In an analogous context, courts in several jurisdictions have allowed
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One theory upon which a defendant may rely to negate tort liability
on limitations grounds is that of implied notice of infection. Similar to
an implied assumption of risk defense,126 the defendant alleges that the
prevalence of STDs in the United States, and more specifically, in a particular city,127 constitutes sufficient notice to an individual involved in
non-monagomous sexual relations of the possibility of becoming infected
with a venereal disease. A homosexual defendant who infects a partner
may argue that the plaintiff was implicitly aware of the high risk of infection at the time of sexual contact because homosexual activity is known
to be "risky behavior."128 It remains to be seen whether courts are willing to preclude recovery for a partner's tortious conduct by imputing
such knowledge of infection to the plaintiff.
For many years, the doctrine of interspousal immunity precluded
liability of one spouse for the intentional or negligent infliction of harm
to the other spouse. 129 In Crowell v. Crowell,130 the Supreme Court of
North Carolina summed up the rationale behind allowing interspousal
suits for transmission of an STD when it stated:
Many laws have become obsolete, even when not changed by
statute and the Constitution, as this has been, and no principle
of justice can maintain the proposition in law, or in morals, that
a debauchee, as the defendant admits himself to be can marry a
virtuous girl, and, continuing his round of dissipation, keep up
his intercourse with lewd women, contracting, as he admits, venereal disease, communicate it to his wife ... SUbjecting her to
humiliation, and ruining her physically for life, ... yet be ex-

126.
127.

128.
129.
130.

recovery for fear of future health effects related to exposure to toxic chemicals. See
Herber v. Johns-ManviIIe Corp., 785 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986) (recovery allowed for
fear of contracting asbestosis despite absence of physical injury); see generally
Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A Solution or a Pandora's Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527 (1984).
In the context of HIV infection, the fear of future adverse health effects may be
that full-blown AIDS will develop. Baruch, AIDS in the Courts: Tort Liability for
the Sexual Transmission ofAcquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 22 TORT & INS.
L.J. 165, 173 (1987). In genital herpes cases, the fear of future adverse health effects
may be the fear associated with the increased risk of developing cervical cancer.
Chuang, Daniel, Perry, Ilstrup & Kurland, Incidence and Trend of Herpes
Progenitalis: A J5-Year Population Study, 58 MAYO CLIN. PROC. 436, 440 (July
1983); see also supra note 68.
See supra notes 106-16 and accompanying text.
According to a 1987 report of the Centers for Disease Control, "the prevalence of
HIV antibody among intravenous (IV) drug users varies markedly by geographic
region." The report, which incorporates the results of 90 independent studies in 53
cities across the United States, concludes that HIV infection among IV drug users
"range[s] from 50% to 60% in New York City, northern New Jersey, and Puerto
Rico to predominantly below 5% in most areas of the country other than the East
Coast." MMWR HIV Infection in the u.s., supra note 2, at 2.
See supra note 89.
For a discussion of the history and current state of the law on interspousal immunity, see generally Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983).
180 N.C. 516, 523, 105 S.E. 206, 210 (1920).
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empted from all liability by the assertion that he and his wife
are one, and that ... he owes no duty to her of making reparation ....
More recently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland abrogated the
doctrine of interspousal immunity in suits for outrageous intentional
torts 131 and negligence actions,132 and the Maryland General Assembly
sealed the fate of interspousal immunity by providing that a married woman may sue her husband for any tort committed against her. 133 In light
of existing law, a defendant cannot successfully make use of the interspousal immunity defense.
Also related to implied assumption of risk in cases involving transmission of STDs such as herpes and AIDS is the theory that a court
should not impose liability for transmission of a disease contracted during illegal sexual conduct. 134 Courts more frequently are imposing liability for transmission of disease between unmarried persons,135 and
legislatures are modifying and repealing statutes prohibiting fornication
and adultery.136 However, Maryland has not legalized such "risky behavior" as sodomy,137 oral sex,138 prostitution,139 or intravenous drug
use. 140
Early cases involving transmission of STDs evidenced courts' unwillingness to impose liability on a defendant for negligence arising from
"immoral" sexual conduct. 141 In recent years, however, courts have .
minimized the illegality defense, at least where the illegal conduct alleged
by the defendant is premarital sexual relations. 142 While the decision in
B.N. v. K.K. demonstrates the court of appeals' conformance with ex131. Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978); see also Note, Maryland Abrogates Interspousal Immunity in Cases o/Outrageous Intentional Torts, 8 U. BALT. L.
REV. 584 (1979).
132. Boblitz v. Boblitz, 296 Md. 242, 462 A.2d 506 (1983).
133. MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 4-204(7) (1984); see also Note, Maryland Abrogates
Interspousal Immunity in Negligence Cases, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 390 (1984).
134. See Comment, Genital Herpes and the Law, supra note 15, at 135-36.
135. See, e.g., Kathleen K., 150 Cal App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). But see
Neville v. State, 290 Md. 364, 382 n.17, 430 A.2d 570,579 n.17 (1981) for a discussion of state regulation of sexual conduct of unmarried adults.
136. See Comment, Genital Herpes and the Law, supra note 15, at 137 n.213.
137. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 553 (1987).
138. See, e.g., id. § 554.
139. See, e.g., id. § 15(g).
140. See, e.g., id. § 276.
141. Deeds v. Strode, 6 Idaho 317,55 P. 656 (1898). In Deeds, a woman, believing herself to be divorced from her first husband, remarried, contracted a venereal disease
from her second husband, and brought suit. After suit was filed, the defendant discovered the plaintiff was not legally divorced, and he asserted illegality as a defense
to the plaintiff's suit. The court agreed with the defendant's asserted defense and
dismissed the plaintiff's action because the injury "could scarcely have arisen but
for the iIlegal relations existing between the parties .... " /d. at 323, 55 P. at 658.
142. But see Zysk v. Zysk, - Va. -, 387 S.E.2d 466 (1990) (holding that because fornication is illegal, one may not receive damages for herpes resulting from participating
in the act of fornication).
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isting precedent in other jurisdictions, it is unclear how Maryland courts
will deal with transmission of STDs through illegal conduct such as intravenous drug use and homosexual activity. The limits of socially accepted behavior may influence the limits of the illegality defense.
In B.N. v. K.K., the Court of Appeals of Maryland recognized
causes of action for negligence, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from the sexual transmission of a dangerous, contagious, and incurable disease such as genital herpes. Through its
holding in B.N. v. K.K., the court of appeals has brought Maryland law
in line with that of the majority of jurisdictions confronted with similar
issues of liability for the transmission of STDs.
Given the ever increasing health problems posed by the growing
number of Maryland citizens infected with STDs, including AIDS, it is
reasonable to conclude that, upon a proper factual showing, Maryland
courts would apply the same legal principles applied in B.N. v. K.K. to
similar actions for assault and battery and for the transmission of AIDS.
In the meantime, citizens can feel more secure that recompense will be
afforded to those affected by irresponsible sexual behavior.

Glen P. Smith

